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ORIGINALIST THEORY AND PRECEDENT:
A PUBLIC MEANING APPROACH1
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF
PRECEDENT. By Randy J. Kozel.2 Cambridge University
Press. 2017. PP. x + 180. $99.99 (hardcover), $34.99 (paper).
Lawrence B. Solum3
INTRODUCTION: ORIGINALISM AND PRECEDENT,
AGAIN?
Much ink has already been spilled on the relationship of
constitutional originalism to precedent (or, more specifically, the
doctrine of stare decisis).4 The debate includes contributions from

1. Copyright 2018 by the author. Permission is hereby granted to make copies
including copies in electronic form for educational or scholarly purposes.
2. Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
3. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
4. The theoretical position that is outlined in this Part provides the gist of ideas
contained in several articles. See Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning:
Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming
2018); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269 (2017);
Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as
Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative
Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013); Lawrence
B. Solum, What Is Originalism?, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: ESSAYS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); Lawrence
B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010);
Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
409, 440 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009). In addition to the published and forthcoming articles, works in
progress include Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis (Aug. 20, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint
Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice (Apr. 11, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215.
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Randy Barnett,5 Steven Calabresi,6 Kurt Lash,7 Gary Lawson,8
John McGinnis with Michael Rappaport,9 Michael Paulsen,10 and
Lee Strang,11 not to mention Justice Antonin Scalia12—all
representing originalism in some form. Living constitutionalism
has also been represented both implicitly and explicitly, with
important contributions from Phillip Bobbitt,13 Ronald
Dworkin,14 Michael Gerhardt,15 Randy Kozel,16 and David
Strauss.17 Some writers are more difficult to classify; Akhil Amar
comes to mind.18 And there are many other contributions to the
debate.19 Opinions range from the view that precedent should
5. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as
It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005).
6. Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent,
and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 637 (2006).
7. Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1437, 1480–81 (2007).
8. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 23 (1994); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent
Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 1 (2007). For critiques of Lawson, see Akhil Reed
Amar, On Lawson on Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (1994); Charles Fried,
Reply to Lawson, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35 (1994); Frederick Schauer, Precedent
and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional Norms, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45
(1994).
9. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 169 (2013).
10. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 289, 291 (2005); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of
Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2731–34 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating
Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?,
109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1537 n.1 (2000).
11. Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of
Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729.
12. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 138–40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
13. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991).
14. The most important text in Dworkin’s extensive body of work is RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); see also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
15. Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006).
16. RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017);
Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 VAND. L. REV. 105, 105
(2015).
17. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
18. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 26, 78–89 (2000).
19. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.
1011 (2003); John Tuskey, Do as We Say and Not (Necessarily) as We Do: The Constitution,
Federalism, and the Supreme Court’s Exercise of Judicial Power, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 153,
180–81 (2005).
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invariably prevail over the original public meaning of the
constitutional text to the polar opposite view, that precedent must
give way to original meaning in almost every case.20
Here is the roadmap. Part I provides a brief introduction to
contemporary originalism. Part II describes the problem of
precedent for originalism, emphasizing that the nature of the
problem depends in part on our understanding of precedent. Part
III offers some reflections on the question as to the constitutional
status of the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis in the United
States Supreme Court.
I. A VERY BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
MEANING ORIGINALISM
“Public Meaning Originalism” (PMO) is the version of
originalist constitutional theory that holds that the content
communicated by the constitutional text to the public at the time
each provision was framed and ratified is binding on
constitutional actors. Like almost all the other members of the
originalist family of constitutional theories,21 PMO includes two
core ideas: (1) the Fixation Thesis (the meaning of each
constitutional provision is fixed at the time the provision was
framed and ratified), and (2) the Constraint Principle
(constitutional practice should, at a minimum, be consistent with
the original meaning of the constitutional text).22
PMO goes beyond the core by arguing that the best
understanding of “original meaning” is the public meaning of the
constitutional text at the time each provision was framed and
ratified: this is the Public Meaning Thesis.23 The public meaning
of the constitutional text is the communicative content,
understood as the content communicated to the public by the text
and the publicly available context of constitutional
communication. Thus, the original meaning is a function of both
(1) semantics and (2) contextual enrichment. The semantic
20. The range of opinions is surveyed in infra Part II.B.
21. Original law originalism may be an exception. See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism
Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 161 (2017) (arguing that the Fixation Thesis would not
play a role in a possible world in which there was not constitutional text but not taking a
position on the role the text played in the original law).
22. Phrases like “Public Meaning Originalism,” “Fixation Thesis” and “Constraint
Principle” are capitalized to indicate that they are proper names for the specific views as
defined.
23. See Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis, supra note 4.
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meaning of the constitutional text is produced by the conventional
semantic meanings of the words and phrases as combined by
syntax (roughly, grammar and punctuation): this is sometimes
called the “literal meaning” of the text. But “literal meaning” is
not the same as the original public meaning of the text. For one
thing, semantic ambiguities are usually resolved by context. For
another, the full communicative content of the text includes what
philosophers of language and linguistic theorists call
“pragmatics”: I will use the phrase “contextual enrichment”24 to
refer to the content generated by implicatures, implicitures,
presuppositions, modulations, and free enrichments.25 Thus, the
full communicative content communicated to the public by the
constitutional text is contextually disambiguated and enriched
semantic content.
Other members of the originalist family differ from PMO in
their account of the nature of original meaning. For example, the
most sophisticated contemporary version of intentionalism holds
that the meaning of the constitutional text is determined by the
communicative intentions of the authors.26 Similarly, original
methods originalism holds that the meaning of the text is the
meaning that the text would have been given at the time of
framing and ratification if the original methods of constitutional
interpretation had been applied.27 Original law originalism is
different: it holds that the original law (and not the meaning of the
text) continues to be binding, unless it is properly changed by
procedures authorized by the original law itself.28
Many originalists also affirm the interpretation-construction
distinction.29 For the purposes of this Article, “interpretation” is

24. In the philosophy of language, the preferred phrase is “pragmatic enrichment.”
François Recanati, Pragmatic Enrichment, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 67 (Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara eds., 2012).
25. See Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 4; Solum, Triangulating Public
Meaning, supra note 4.
26. See Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF
ORIGINALISM (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). A different approach that
does not specify a conception of “intention” is found in the work of Richard Kay. See, e.g.,
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).
27. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, THE GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra note 9.
28. See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015);
Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
817 (2015).
29. See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 4.
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stipulated to be the activity that discovers the meaning (more
precisely, communicative content30) of the constitutional text.
“Construction” is stipulated to be the activity that determines the
legal effect to be given that meaning. Legal effects include the
decision of cases by courts, constitutional actions by officials and
institutions and the announcement of legal norms in the form of
constitutional doctrines—usually, but not always, contained in
judicial opinions. Although this distinction might be described
using a different vocabulary, the underlying conceptual
distinction is fundamental and should be accepted by all
constitutional theorists. The meaning of a text is one kind of thing;
its application is a different kind of thing—no one should dispute
this distinction. This distinction has a long history in American
legal theory, beginning with Francis Lieber and crystallizing in the
work of the great contracts scholar, Arthur Corbin.31
The interpretation-construction distinction interacts with the
degree of constitutional underdeterminacy.32 For almost all
originalists, if the constitutional text is determinate with respect
to a particular issue or case, all of the important work is done at
the interpretation stage (setting aside the role of precedent). Once
we know the determinate meaning of the text, then the proper
construction follows. But if the text is underdeterminate, allowing
more than one possible outcome in a constitutional case, then
constitutional construction will be required.

30. The communicative content of the constitutional text is best conceptualized as
the set of concepts and propositions conveyed by the text—in the philosophical sense of
“propositions” and “concepts.” See Matthew McGrath & Devin Frank, Propositions, in
THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/propositions/.
31. See generally Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 1: Francis Lieber, NEW
PRIV. L. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/19/interpretation-andconstruction-1-francis-lieber-greg-klass/; Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 2:
PRIV.
L.
(Nov.
23,
2015),
Samuel
Williston,
NEW
https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/23/interpretation-and-construction-2-samuelwilliston-greg-klass/; Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 3: Arthur Linton Corbin,
NEW PRIV. L. (Nov. 25, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/25/interpretationand-construction-3-arthur-linton-corbin-greg-klass/; see also Ralf Poscher, The
Hermeneutical Character of Legal Construction, in LAW’S HERMENEUTICS: OTHER
INVESTIGATIONS
(Simone
Glanert
&
Fabien
Girard
eds.,
2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2696486.
32. On the role of determinacy in originalist theory, see Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive
Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459 (2016); see also Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy
Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987).
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We can use the phrase “construction zone”33 to refer to the
set of issues with respect to which the original meaning of the
constitutional text is underdeterminate. Similarly, the phrase
“interpretation zone”34 can be used to designate the case where
the crucial work is done by the communicative content of the
constitutional text. The version of PMO developed in my work
affirms the interpretation-construction distinction and assumes
moderate constitutional underdeterminacy.
An originalist methodology describes the practices by which
the original meaning of the constitutional text can be discovered.
Ideally, an originalist methodology will provide a set of best
practices that yield results that can be replicated and verified. In
Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion,
and the Constitutional Record,35 I have suggested that original
public meaning can best be determined using a combination of
three techniques: (1) the method of corpus linguistics, (2) the
method of studying the constitutional record, and (3) the method
of originalist immersion. Each of these three methods provides a
check on the others, allowing for the triangulation of public
meaning.
The debate about the proper relationship between
originalism and precedent can be understood in two distinct ways:
first, as a debate internal to originalist constitutional theory, and
second, as an external critique of originalism. The internal debate
is complicated by the theoretical differences among originalists.
Likewise, the external critique is complexified by the many
different versions of nonoriginalist constitutional theory. Of
necessity, this Review simplifies, focusing on PMO as the
representative form of originalism and relying on a generic form
of nonoriginalist living constitutionalism to stand in for many
distinct views.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PRECEDENT FOR ORIGINALIST
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
With a brief introduction to PMO on the table, I now turn to
a statement of the problem of precedent and originalism.
33. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 572
(2010).
34. Samuel P. Jordan & Christopher K. Bader, State Power to Define Jurisdiction, 47
GA. L. REV. 1161, 1213 (2013) (using the phrase “interpretation zone”).
35. See Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 4.
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A. WHY IS PRECEDENT A PROBLEM FOR ORIGINALISM?
Precedent is clearly a component of constitutional litigation
as currently practiced. The opinions of the Justices and the briefs
filed by parties are filled with citations to cases. But originalism
seems (on the surface) to suggest that this is a mistake. If the
public meaning of the constitutional text requires a certain
outcome, then the Constraint Principle suggests that the citation
of precedent is superfluous and adherence to authority that is
contrary to original meaning is wrong. PMO seems to imply that
current practice of precedent in constitutional cases is mistaken: a
radical change is required. Some versions of living
constitutionalism avoid this problem entirely; for example,
common law constitutionalism relies on constraint by precedent
as the primary alternative to constraint by the constitutional text.
Why is this implication of PMO a problem? One problem is
very practical: the doctrine of stare decisis is pervasive, and it may
be difficult to get judges and Justices to adhere to original
meaning when it is inconsistent with precedent. But suppose that
it is practically possible to comply with original meaning and
overrule all the precedents that would stand in the way. There
would still be a question as to whether it would be normatively
desirable to do so. As we will see below, there is a range of views
about the proper normative alignment of precedent and original
meaning.36 The normative arguments favoring precedent over
originalism are too numerous and complex to enumerate here.
One especially difficult problem would occur during the transition
to originalism: compliance with original meaning may require a
wholesale revision in constitutional doctrine on a variety of topics
and hence could introduce instability into the law. Another
problem would arise if the precedents are normatively more
attractive than the original meaning. The discussion that follows
focuses on these “normative problems of precedent” for
originalism.
B. THE RANGE OF VIEWS
Now consider the range of views about the proper
relationship between precedent and original meaning. Some
living constitutionalists take the position that precedent should
always (or almost always) displace original meaning; we might call
36.

See infra Part II.B.
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this the “living constitutionalist hard line.” David Strauss
represents this view;37 his version of common law
constitutionalism makes precedent the alpha and omega of
constitutional analysis. The hard line can be contrasted to what
we call a “living constitutionalist soft line,” which would allow the
original meaning of the constitutional text to prevail over
precedent in at least some cases. Constitutional pluralism allows
for this possibility: if both precedent and text are methods or
modalities of constitutional interpretation and construction, then
there may be cases in which precedent must give way to the
original meaning.
Some originalists, especially Gary Lawson38 and Michael
Paulsen,39 advocate an “originalist hard line,” taking the position
that the original meaning must always (or almost always) prevail
over precedent: because they believe that the constitution itself
provides default rules that resolve what would otherwise be cases
of underdetermination, their view (taken to its logical extreme)
would seem to imply that precedent should play no role in
constitutional adjudication. Other originalists are softliners.
Famously, Justice Scalia, wrote, “stare decisis is not part of my
originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it.”40 Randy
Barnett allows for precedent to play a role in the construction
zone.41 Lee Strang would allow for a stare decisis effect for
originalist precedent.42
C. THEORIES OF STARE DECISIS
There is a large and complex literature on the theory of
precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis,43 including Randy
Kozel’s important book, Settled Versus Right. The word
“precedent” can refer to many things, but I will be discussing
judicial precedent in the form of the doctrine of stare decisis for
the remainder of this Article.

37. David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1, 57 (2015).
38. See supra note 8 for citations.
39. See supra note 10 for citations.
40. SCALIA, supra note 12, at 138–40.
41. Barnett, supra note 5.
42. Strang, supra note 11.
43. Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989);
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
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Vertical and horizontal stare decisis should be
distinguished.44 Vertical stare decisis requires lower courts to give
binding effect to the holdings of higher courts to which they are
subordinate, whereas horizontal stare decisis requires a court to
give its own prior decisions something that is less than binding
effect but more than merely persuasive effect.
Although I cannot marshal the evidence on this occasion, I
believe that there are at least three distinct theories of stare decisis
that are explicitly or implicitly operating in the courts in the
United States. The first of these theories is what I will call the
“ratio decidendi view.” It maintains that the holding of a case is
the rule that is logically entailed by the reasoning that was
necessary to reach the outcome on the basis of the legally salient
facts and the arguments of the parties. The second theory I call
the “legally salient facts account.” This view maintains that the
holding of the case requires that the same outcome be reached if
and only if all of the legally salient facts are identical. The third
theory is the “predictive theory,” which is the view that the
holding of a case is the best prediction of the rule that the court
would use to decide future cases: this theory gives special weight
to “we hold that” statements, because such statements are
especially good evidence of the court’s likely future behavior.45
These three theories are radically different from one another.
The predictive theory allows for very broad holdings that reach
far beyond the facts of the particular case. The legally salient facts
account results in very narrow holdings, because in almost all
cases there are numerous facts that are legally salient: broad rules
only emerge from a series of decisions. The ratio decidendi view
can result in either broad or narrow holdings, depending on the
reasoning used to reach the outcome and its interaction with the
facts and arguments of the parties. My impression is that the
current state of the doctrine of stare decisis is radically disordered.
Many judges cannot even articulate their own theory of stare
decisis, adopting an eclectic approach that uses different theories
on different occasions. Worse, some judges may use more than
one theory on a single occasion. Sadly, many in the legal academy
44. See Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis,
in PRECEDENT IN LAW 81–82 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
45. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Holdings, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON (last
modified July 30, 2017), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/10/legal_
theory_le_2.html.

7 - SOLUM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

460

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10/6/18 10:57 AM

[Vol. 33:451

are equally confused, reflecting decades of neglect of this
important topic.
D. THE EASIER PROBLEM OF VERTICAL PRECEDENT
What should originalists say about vertical precedent? For
example, what should a United States District Court judge do
when the holding of a Supreme Court case requires an outcome
that differs from the outcome required by the original meaning?
Although there is room for reasoned disagreement, the
conventional wisdom is that this is an easy case: the lower court is
bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Even if one
believes that the Supreme Court itself should always follow the
original meaning, there are very strong arguments that lower
courts should not strike out on their own. If every judge were
authorized to impose their own view of the original meaning of
the constitutional text, the rule of law values of predictability,
certainty, stability, publicity, and uniformity would be
undermined. Given the reality that different judges may have
different views about original meaning, there is even potential for
a kind of judicial anarchy that could lead to substantial disorder.
From an originalist perspective, there is a further question,
whether vertical stare decisis is consistent with the public meaning
of the constitutional text: some remarks on this topic are provided
below.46
E. THE HARDER PROBLEM OF HORIZONTAL PRECEDENT
What about the United States Supreme Court? Or a state
court of last resort in cases arising under a state constitution? How
should these courts deal with horizontal precedent when it
conflicts with original meaning? This problem is only hard for
those who accept originalism or adhere to a version of living
constitutionalism that includes both original meaning and
precedent as methods or modalities of constitutional
interpretation and construction. For a common law
constitutionalist, there is no problem at all: precedent or
departures from precedent justified by common law methods
always win.
Why might originalists go with precedent rather than original
meaning? There are several possibilities, including the following:
46.

See infra Part III.
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(1) the original meaning of the constitution itself requires
adherence to precedent; (2) although original meaning should
prevail over precedent as a matter of ideal theory, there are good
and sufficient reasons to adhere to precedent as a matter of
nonideal theory during a period of transition from living
constitutionalism to originalism; (3) although original meaning is
binding as a source of first order reasons, there are good and
sufficient second-order reasons to utilize a system that
incorporates the doctrine of stare decisis as the mechanism by
which original meaning is determined. Part III of this Article will
offer some observations about the first possibility—that original
meaning requires adherence to precedent. The other three
possibilities are explored in the remainder of this Part.
F. PRECEDENT AND THE UNDERLYING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
ORIGINALISM
Originalists differ with respect to the underlying justifications
for originalism. To simplify, let us assume that there are two
primary strands of justification: (1) the rule of law and (2)
democratic legitimacy. What implications do these different
justifications have for the role of precedent in an originalist
jurisprudence? In the discussion that follows, I will argue that this
role should be understood as transitional. In the discussion that
follows, I will discuss two justifications for the Constraint
Principle: the first focuses on the rule of law and the second is
based on the idea of democratic legitimacy.47 Each justification for
constraint has implications for the role of precedent in the
transition to originalism.
The full case for originalism on the basis of the rule of law is
complex and multidimensional,48 but one version of the argument
focuses on the rule of law values of predictability, certainty,
stability, publicity, and uniformity. Consider the following
thought experiment:
Originalist Big Bang Thought Experiment: The appointment of
nine originalist judges within a few years creates a system of
constitutional adjudication in which the Supreme Court
decides each and every constitutional issue solely on the basis
47. See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 4.
48. Id. (describing three distinct rule-of-law justifications for the Constraint
Principle, including (1) an argument from the rule of law values, (2) an argument from
judicial tyranny, and (3) an argument from politicization of the judiciary).
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of the Court’s best current judgment about the original
meaning of the constitutional text. This results in an originalist
big bang. Over the course of a few terms, the Supreme Court
(1) invalidates all independent regulatory agencies based on
the original meaning of executive, legislative, and judicial
power, (2) strikes down half the provisions of the United States
Code as exceeding Congress’s enumerated powers, (3)
prohibits plea bargaining and requires jury trials in all criminal
cases, (4) eliminates substantive due process, and (5) restores
the original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
As a result of the big bang, federal law as a whole becomes
unpredictable, inconsistent, and uncertain.49

In the hypothetical world of the thought experiment, an
originalist big bang would be inconsistent with the rule of law
justification for originalism.
For this reason, even a Supreme Court with nine originalist
Justices might adhere to precedent during a transitional period.
Indeed, this idea of a gradual transition to originalism could be
built into originalism itself: for example, I have articulated a
version of the Constraint Principle that requires consistency with
originalism “in due course” and not immediately.50 The length of
the transition period would depend on the extensiveness of the
changes required by originalism and judgments about the rapidity
with which they could be effected without damage to the rule of
law. And this might depend on reactions from the political system:
for example, an initial decision suggesting the unconstitutionality
of one independent regulatory agency might create political
conditions that would enable a constitutional amendment that
squared such agencies (with proper safeguards) with the rule of
law.
Likewise, the democratic legitimacy rationale for originalism
might justify gradual implementation of the Constraint
Principle.51 Some precedents might actually be consistent with
49. I am not taking the position that originalism would require all of the five
outcomes described in text. This is a thought experiment, not an analysis of the original
meaning of the constitutional text.
50. This is the position I take in Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 4
(manuscript at 21) (stating the Constraint Principle with the following qualifications: “If
[the requirements of constraint as consistency] are not satisfied, then constitutional
practice should be brought into compliance with constraint over time, giving due regard to
the effects of constitutional change on the rule of law.”).
51. In The Constraint Principle, I argue that there are three legitimacy-based
justifications for constraint: (1) democratic legitimacy, (2) transparency, and (3) legitimate
judicial role. See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 4.
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democratic legitimacy: for example, nonoriginalist precedents in
the voting rights area might be consistent with the underlying
democratic legitimacy arguments for originalism. In other cases,
clear and convincing evidence might indicate wide and deep
support for precedents that are inconsistent with original
meaning. In such cases, the value of democratic legitimacy might
itself support a gradual transition to originalism, such that
democratic processes could produce constitutional amendments
that would bring the original meaning of the constitutional text
into line with the results preferred by democratic consensus.
Randy Kozel has a different account of the relationship
between the underlying justifications for originalism and
precedent. Kozel maintains that forms of originalism are
differentiated by their underlying justifications. Thus,
“consequentialist originalism” is distinct from “popular
sovereignty” originalism. Kozel then argues that the normative
justifications for originalism directly bear on the question whether
precedent is consistent with originalism (pp. 65-66). This move
confuses first-order and second-order reasons. In the
constitutional context, a first-order reason is the reason given for
resolution of a constitutional case or issue, whereas a secondorder reason determines which first-order reasons should be
brought to bear.
The whole point of originalism is to provide second-order
reasons that make a certain kind of first-order reason mandatory.
For PMO, the first-order reasons provided by the original public
meaning of the constitutional text override other first-order
reasons: this is the point of the Constraint Principle. Of course,
the Constraint Principle must itself be justified in some way: the
justifications for constraint are second-order reasons. For
example, I have argued that the Constraint Principle is justified
by two clusters of arguments, one based on the rule of law and the
other grounded in the idea of democratic legitimacy.52
Kozel’s argument implicitly assumes that the second-order
reasons that justify a given form of originalism can then be applied
directly to questions of constitutional interpretation. In other
words, Kozel assumes that the second-order reasons that justify
originalism provide first-order reasons to ignore originalism itself.
This is a mistake, even if some originalists have made it: the whole
52.

See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 4.
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point of a second-order reason is to specify what first-order
reasons are required or permitted. For originalists, the idea that
originalism is a method for “[d]eterming how costly it would be to
uphold a precedent” shows a fundamental misunderstanding of
originalism itself. Violations of the Constraint Principle are not a
cost to be weighed in an all-things-considered judgment about
what is the right thing to do: the balancing approach to
constitutional practice is a form of nonoriginalist living
constitutionalism.
Many of Kozel’s arguments work, if they are limited to a
period of transition from living constitutionalism to full
implementation of originalism. But the same underlying
justifications that support a transitional period would have
different implications in the long run. The rule of law and
democratic legitimacy support the Constraint Principle, which
requires consistency with the constitutional text. Once the
transition to originalism is complete, the use of precedent ought
to be brought into line with the original meaning of the
constitutional text.
G. PRECEDENT AND NONIDEAL THEORY
When originalism is presented as an ideal theory,53 many
thorny problems are “swept under the rug.” We simply assume a
world in which originalism has already been adopted and in which
all of the relevant constitutional actors both affirm originalism as
the correct theory and are motivated to conform their actions to
the Constraint Principle. In the actual world, originalism has not
been adopted, many constitutional actors reject originalism, and
even actors who affirm originalism in principle may not be
motivated to comply with the Constraint Principle in some
circumstances. Originalism is hotly debated, and it seems likely
that many executive officials, members of Congress, judges, and
Justices reject originalism.
Political and judicial originalism aim at the realization of
originalism in both the long run and the short term. This means
that many questions of tactics and strategy are on the table,
especially in the early days of a transition to originalism.
Originalist judges on a collegial court may need to write
53. For explication of the distinction between ideal and nonideal theories, see
Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307 (2008).
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nonoriginalist opinions as part of the give and take required to get
judicial business done—and even to limit the number of occasions
upon which they write extensive originalist concurrences and
dissents. An originalist judge might make the tactical decision that
a precedent-based decision that moves the law towards original
meaning is better than a dissent or concurrence accompanying a
decision that moves the law in the opposite direction.
Originalist senators might vote to confirm nonoriginalist
judges as a matter of political compromise or accommodation to
the fact that the judiciary must continue to function. Under actual
political conditions, judges who are committed to precedent may
be preferable to those who embrace judicial legislation unbound
by law of any sort. For all these reasons and more, nonoriginalist
precedent might be endorsed by political and judicial originalism
(the practical versions of originalism for officials and judges)—
not as the first best option, but as an originalist second best.54
H. PRECEDENT AND DISAGREEMENT ABOUT ORIGINAL
MEANING
In originalist heaven, there would be universal agreement
about the original meaning of the constitutional text and every
constitutional actor would comply with that meaning: precedent
would have no role in constitutional practice. Every decision
would be correct and adherence to precedent would be
superfluous. But in the actual world, things are more complex. In
the actual world, the original meaning of many constitutional
provisions is uncertain. In the actual world, there is likely to be
disagreement about original meaning. Some of that disagreement
may result from good faith differences about the weighing of the
evidence, but some may result from motivated reasoning or badfaith results-oriented manipulation of the evidence. Partially ideal
theory should take these complications into account.
Given a world in which there is disagreement about original
meaning, there are good reasons to create mechanisms of
institutional settlement. The doctrine of stare decisis is such a
mechanism. Vertical stare decisis centralizes institutional
authority to determine original meaning in the Supreme Court.
This centralization of authority would likely be superior to a
54. The idea of an originalist second-best is explored in Solum, Constitutional
Possibilities, supra note 53.
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decentralized regime for reasons that have already been
discussed. Decentralized authority over the law is unworkable,
given substantial disagreement about legal content.
Horizontal stare decisis can play a similar role. The Justices
of the Supreme Court may disagree about original meaning in
good faith. Given the uncertainty about original meaning,
horizontal stare decisis would facilitate the stability of law:
mistakes about original meaning could be corrected, but
deference to prior decisions would facilitate an orderly process.
Without some such mechanism, the Court might change its mind
about the correct interpretation of some constitutional provisions
on a regular basis—as new evidence came to light or new
arguments were made about the meaning of the evidence.
Horizontal stare decisis on questions of interpretation might
operate to preserve the status quo until clear and convincing
evidence had produced a substantial consensus that there had
been an error.
Notice that this justification for precedent only operates
when the prior decision involved a good faith attempt to
determine the original meaning of the constitutional text.
Decisions that ignored original meaning or gave decisive weight
to policy judgments about desirable outcomes would not be
entitled to deference on this ground. Originalist precedents would
be entitled to deference, but nonoriginalist precedents would only
be followed for other reasons—such as those identified above.55
I. PRECEDENT AND THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE
The discussion so far has been about the relationship
between precedent and interpretation, but from the perspective
of PMO, there is a distinct question about the role of precedent in
the construction zone. By definition, a case is in the construction
zone if and only if the original meaning of the constitutional text
is underdeterminate with respect to an outcome-affecting issue.
Consider the simplest case, in which the text is vague or opentextured. Let us assume that the preferred method of
constitutional construction requires the Court to precisify: for
example, the Court needs to devise a rule to resolve the
borderline cases between executive and legislative power. Once
the Court has chosen a rule, the doctrine of horizontal stare
55.

See supra Parts II.F, II.G.
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decisis could be applied without violating the Constraint
Principle. Similar points could be made about what are called
“implementing rules”—norms of constitutional law that
implement original meaning.
For example, if the exclusionary rule were consistent with
original meaning (a big “if”) and if the exclusionary rule faithfully
implemented the Fourth Amendment (another big “if”), then the
doctrine of horizontal stare decisis would suggest that the cases
establishing the rule should not be overturned without especially
good reasons. Moreover, the rule of law might favor giving
precedent in the construction zone “gravitational force” in order
to produce constitutional norms that are coherent, consistent, and
stable. Resolving issues about the precise role of precedent will be
determined by a theory of constitutional construction, a topic that
is addressed below.56
III. PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ABOUT A PUBLIC
MEANING ORIGINALIST INQUIRY INTO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF PRECEDENT
From an originalist perspective, there is a further question: is
stare decisis consistent with original meaning? The discussion that
follows looks at this question from the perspective of PMO. Does
the original public meaning of the constitutional text permit,
forbid, or require a doctrine of stare decisis to be applied to
questions of constitutional interpretation and construction? I
provide a set of ideas about how a PMO inquiry should proceed
but do not attempt to examine the evidence and reach
conclusions.
The first step in the quest for original public meaning is an
inquiry into the semantic meaning of the words and phrases. This
requires identification of the relevant parts of the constitutional
text and structure. The constitutional text makes no explicit
reference to precedent or stare decisis. Nonetheless, there are
clauses that might have implications for the constitutional status
of precedent. The key phrases include “judicial power,” “one
Supreme Court,” “inferior courts,” and “the Supreme Law of the
Land.” Structurally, the division of authority between the
supreme and the inferior courts and separation of powers
between the “Judicial,” “Executive,” and “Legislative” branches
56.

See infra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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may be relevant as well. The aim of PMO is to recover the
communicative comments of the relevant clauses, as well as any
additional content communicated by the constitutional structure.
Practices, expectations, and goals may be relevant to this inquiry
as evidence, but PMO does not take the position that these
practices, expectations, and goals are binding at the interpretation
stage.57
The best approach to recovering the original semantic
meaning of the words and phrases would utilize corpus linguistics,
but as of this writing the most useful data set, COFEA (the
Corpus of Founding Era American English) is still in beta
testing.58 Corpus analysis provides primary evidence of patterns
of usage, which are constitutive of semantic meaning. Period
dictionaries provide secondary evidence, and they may be
especially helpful in identifying the range of possible senses
(semantic meanings) of the semantic units that comprise the
constitutional text. Similar analysis of syntax, including grammar
and punctuation, would be required as well. Immersion in the
period by study of a wide variety of texts provides a second route
to the recovery of the relevant semantics and syntax.
The second step involves attention to context, including the
context provided by the whole constitutional text, the
constitutional record, relevant historical events (e.g., the
Revolutionary War and experience under the Articles of
Confederation), and other salient facts. From the perspective of
PMO, the relevant context is the publicly accessible context—
those features of the whole context that would have been
accessible to the “public”—understood as citizens who were
competent speakers of American English at the relevant time.
The investigation of context requires study of the constitutional
record and the history of the period. Once again, immersion
provides a second route for recovery of the context that would
have been accessible to the public.
The goal of such inquiry is the recovery of the full
communicative content of the constitutional text: what did the
57. The role of practices, expectations, and goals at the construction stage is a
different matter. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit:
A
Unified
Theory
of
Originalism,
GEO.
L.J.
(forthcoming
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049056.
58. BYU Law 2018 Law & Corpus Linguistics Conference, Law & Corpus Linguistics
Project, BYU L., http://lawcorpus.byu.edu/2018-conference/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
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Constitution communicate to the public? No answers to this
question are provided here, but we can note some important
questions that should be asked:
• What was the semantic content of the phrase “judicial
power”? Was judicial power understood to encompass
some version of the doctrine of stare decisis? Was the
phrase “judicial power” underdeterminate with respect to
precedent, allowing but not requiring the exercise of some
range of binding judicial precedent?
• What was the meaning of “one Supreme Court” as
contrasted with “inferior courts”? Did the characterization
of the highest Court as “Supreme” (and other courts as
“inferior”) entail a power of vertical stare decisis, or was
this power limited to what we now call “law of the case”
and “claim preclusion” (res judicata)? Again, was this
meaning thick (specifying the powers that accompany a
“supreme” court), or thin (creating a construction zone)?
• What are the implications of the Supremacy Clause for
precedent? Does the Supremacy Clause implicitly place the
Constitution at the top of the hierarchy of law? Does the
omission of precedent from the list of supreme law entail
that judicial precedent cannot override the constitutional
text?
These questions provide a sense of the inquiry that will be
required at the interpretation stage. It is possible that
interpretation will resolve the constitutional status of vertical and
horizontal stare decisis. But there is also the possibility that the
constitutional status of precedent is located in the construction
zone. For example, we might conclude that the doctrine of vertical
stare decisis is required by the notion of a “Supreme Court” but
that the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis is underdetermined.
What then?
The current state of play is that there is continued inquiry,
discussion, and debate on the question as to what theory of
constitutional construction should be incorporated into PMO.
Two things seem clear: (1) constitutional construction must
respect the Constraint Principle (consistency with the public
meaning of the constitutional text in due course) and (2) the
general approach to cases and issues in the construction zone must
be consistent with the underlying normative justifications for
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originalism (e.g., the rule of law and democratic legitimacy).
Among the possible approaches are: (1) a constitutional functions
approach that emphasizes the original purposes of constitutional
provisions;59 (2) a default rules approach that would apply rules of
deference where the constitution is not clear;60 and (3) an original
methods approach that would look to original methods for
resolving cases of constitutional underdeterminacy.61
These three approaches (and others) might diverge on
important issues. For example, a default rules approach might
give the Supreme Court discretion in the absence of a statute that
codifies the doctrine of judicial precedent. The constitutional
functions approach might suggest that the doctrine of stare decisis
must be subordinate to the central function of the constitutional
text (to govern those who govern us) and hence that
nonoriginalist precedents and precedents that undermine the
original functions of particular constitutional provisions are not
entitled to any substantial weight in the Supreme Court. The
original methods approach would require a careful investigation
of the methods of constitutional construction in the 1780s; it might
be that the doctrines of horizontal and vertical stare decisis as they
existed at that time would be considered original methods
themselves.
CONCLUSION: ORIGINALISM AND PRECEDENT,
AGAIN!
The central aim of this article is to issue a call to action,
urging constitutional scholars to return to the problem of
precedent for originalism in a rigorous way that takes into account
recent developments in constitutional theory. The focus here has
been on PMO, but similar points could be made from the
perspectives of intentionalism, original methods originalism, and
original law originalism. Despite all the spilled ink, much work
remains to be done.
59. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 57.
60. For elaboration, see Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 4, at 511–23.
For Lawson, see Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1233–34
(2012). For Paulsen, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for
Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2009). Lawson and Paulsen enunciate
different sets of default rules and they believe the default rules can be gleaned from
constitutional interpretation—and hence that they eliminate constitutional
underdeterminacy: these issues are discussed in my Constitutional Construction.
61. McGinnis & Rappaport, The Good Constitution, supra note 9.

